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There is a long-standing view that the masses are mindless and hence should 
only be appealed to in the simplest possible terms. Ever since Herodotus, the 
so-called “father of history,” exclaimed “I hate the blind mass,” this view has 
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had many classical adherents. In modern times, however, it was most forcibly 
and influentially expressed by Gustave Le Bon in his text ‘The Crowd’.1 Le Bon 
argued that as soon as people become anonymous within the crowd, they lose 
their sense of identity, their ability to judge, and hence they uncritically accept 
any passing idea and emotion. There is no point in appealing to them with 
reasoned arguments, content becomes almost irrelevant. What matters is how 
things are expressed: make it clear, make it simple and say it repeatedly. As long 
as these rules are observed, the mass can be led in almost any direction.
Introduction: Group theory and models of mass infl uence
Le Bon’s explicit aim was to advise the autocrats of his age on how to turn the 
masses from a threat into a bulwark of the existing order, and he was highly suc-
cessful in this regard. The list of his admirers reads like a roll call of early twen-
tieth century dictators, including Mussolini, Goebbels and Hitler.2 Indeed, it is 
as filtered through these acolytes that Le Bonian principles have achieved most 
resonance. Thus Hitler wrote: “I use emotion for the many and reserve reason 
for the few.” This was echoed by Goebbels, who advised that: “The most brilliant 
propagandist technique will yield no success unless one fundamental principle 
is borne in mind constantly — it must confine itself to a few points and repeat 
them over and over.” Or, more succinctly and most famously perhaps, Goebbels 
boasted that “if you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will even-
tually come to believe it.”
Classic models of infl uence: All form and no content
While the post-Nazi world has rejected the content of Goebbels’ lies, it has 
retained his claims about the process of lie-telling — or at least the general 
assumption that mass influence depends upon the form and not the content 
of what is said. In part this is because the underlying Le Bonian assumptions 
about loss of self have been retained in some modern theories of the group and 
of group influence.3
In part it is because of the ways in which others challenged Le Bon’s 
legacy. They did so by saying that groups were constituted either by the 
individual characteristics of members or, more usually, by the relations of 
dependency between these individuals. In 1976, Moscovici wrote a trenchant 
critique of this, by then, mainstream view.4 He pointed out that if groups are 
1  Gustave Le Bon, Psychologie des foules, 1895; translated into English: The Crowd: A Study of the Popular 
Mind, 1897. 
2  Serge Moscovici, L’age des foules, Fayard, Paris, 1981; R. Nye, The Origins of Crowd Psychology, Sage, New 
York, 1975.
3  See Stephen Reicher, Russell Spears, & Tom Postmes, “A social identity model of deindividuation 
phenomena,” European Review of Social Psychology, Vol. 6, 1995, pp. 161-198.
4  Serge Moscovici, Social Infl uence and Social Change, Academic Press, London, 1976.
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constituted out of inter-individual dependency relations and if social influence 
follows these lines of dependency, then it can only serve to reproduce existing 
inequalities of power. Irrespective of their message, those upon whom others are 
dependent will spread influence, and, irrespective of what they are told, those 
who are dependent upon others will be influenced. Moscovici argued that this 
ignores the role of dissidents in promoting social change and launched a whole 
tradition of research on minority influence. But even within this tradition, 
a critique of the critique of Le Bon, the emphasis was still on how things were 
said — minorities must be consistent in their views without laying themselves 
open to being dismissed as simply rigid — rather than what is said.5
The bizarre result of all this is that psychological studies of social influ-
ence, to the extent that they even consider what speakers are saying (rather 
than what speakers or the audience are like), for the most part analyse general 
features of a text, such as how complex it is or whether it uses one-sided as 
opposed to two-sided arguments. Studies very rarely look at precisely what is 
being said.
A new psychology of mass infl uence
In this article we will challenge both this general neglect of content and the 
more specific claim that mass communication must necessarily substitute pas-
sion for reason. However, as should be clear by now, such claims are not inciden-
tal but rather are deeply rooted in the more general history of group psychology. 
Our challenge, then, will start by outlining an alternative social psychology of 
groups. From that we will draw some general principles about mass social influ-
ence, and will then go on to show how these principles can be applied either to 
promoting acts of violence against others or else acts of solidarity and succour.
Social identity and collective action
At one level, Le Bon and his early critics appear as polar opposites. Le Bon claimed 
that identity was lost in the group. His critics 6 claimed that identity was retained 
or even accentuated in the mass. But despite this, both shared the assumption that 
the individual self constituted the sole basis of reasoned action. Social factors, 
such as the presence of others, might affect the operation of this self, but 
neither theorist entertained the idea that such factors might actually constitute 
the self, thus providing a social basis for the norms, values — and hence 
judgements — that shape collective action.7 Work within the social identity 
5  Serge Moscovici, “Social infl uence and conformity,” in G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (eds.), Handbook of Social 
Psychology, 3rd edition, Vol. 2, Random House, New York, 1985, pp. 347-412.
6  See as an example Floyd Allport, Social Psychology, Houghton Miffl in, Boston MA., 1924.
7  For a more detailed development of this point see Stephen Reicher, “Crowd behaviour as social action,” 
in J. Turner, M. Hogg, P. Oakes, S.D. Reicher & M. Wetherell, Rediscovering the Social Group, Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1987.
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tradition (including both social identity theory 8 and the later development of 
the self-categorization theory 9) is based on a challenge to this viewpoint.
Identity as a multi-level system
For social identity theorists, the self is not a unitary individual construct but 
instead is a complex system. While we always defi ne our identity in terms of 
our relationship to others, this can be done at different levels of abstraction: on 
the subordinate or personal level (where my self is what makes “I” distinct from 
“you”); on the intermediate or social level (what makes “us” distinct from “them”); 
and on the superordinate or human level (what makes people distinct from non-
humans). Most attention, however, has been paid to the level of social identifi ca-
tion, that is, the identities which derive from our membership of social groups. It 
is important to stress the plural here. Insofar as we all belong to several groups, we 
also have a series of social identities (myself as a European, as a humanitarian, as a 
Jew, as a woman and so on) which will be salient to us in different contexts.
The core argument of the social identity tradition is that the psycho-
logical shift from a personal to a social level of identification underlies the 
behavioural shift from individual to group action. Indeed, shared social iden-
tification is what makes collective action possible.10 The corollary is that group 
behaviour is associated with depersonalization. In other words, as group mem-
bers we tend to see self and others in terms of the social categories they belong 
to — and, more particularly, whether they belong to the same group as ourselves 
(ingroup members) or to another group (outgroup members) — rather than 
their specific individual characteristics. More generally, we tend to see events in 
the world in terms of their significance to our group and to ourselves as group 
members rather than their implications for ourselves as distinct individuals. 
Social identity as basis of social power
There is meanwhile a rich and complex body of research based on these princi-
ples and we have no space to do it justice here.11 However, for present purposes, 
there are three elements in particular that are of especial relevance. First, shared 
group membership transforms the relationship between people in such a way 
as to enable coordinated and effective collective action. Thus, when people view 
8  Henri Tajfel & John Turner, “An integrative theory of intergroup confl ict,” in W. G. Austin & S. Worchel 
(eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, Brooks/Cole, Monterey, CA, 1979, pp. 33-47.
9  Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, op. cit. (note 7).
10 John Turner, “Towards a cognitive redefi nition of the social group,” in H. Tajfel (ed.), Social Identity and 
Intergroup Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 15-40; Stephen Reicher & Alex Haslam, 
(in press) “Rethinking the psychology of tyranny: The BBC Prison Study,” British Journal of Social Psychology.
11 For reviews, see Naomi Ellemers, Russell Spears & Bertjan Doojse, “Self and social identity,” Annual 
Review of Psychology, Vol. 53, 2002, pp. 161-186; Alex Haslam, Psychology in Organizations, Sage, London, 
2001; for an elaboration of principles see John Turner, “Some current issues in research on social identity 
and self-cate gorization theories,” in N. Ellemers, R. Spears & B. Doosje (eds.), Social Identity: Context, 
Commitment, Content, Blackwell, Oxford, 1999, pp. 6-34; Stephen Reicher, “The context of social 
psychology: Domination, resistance and change,” Political Psychology, Vol. 25, 2004, pp. 40-62.
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others as belonging to the same category as they do, they are more likely to trust, 
respect and cooperate with them;12 they are more likely to offer them help and 
solidarity13 and they are more likely to seek out agreement with them. All this 
combined leads to enhanced organizational efficiency.14 One aspect of this is 
particularly important for the ensuing argument. It is that where people share 
an identity and hence share values and priorities, it becomes possible for some-
body (or some bodies) to represent what they have in common. In other words, 
shared identity makes leadership possible.15 This further enhances the ability 
of a set of people to ensure that their efforts complement each other and are 
directed in the most effective way to reach group goals. In short, social identity 
is an important basis of social power — especially for groups which otherwise 
lack resources or control institutions.16
Self-stereotyping and the process of conversion
Second, when people categorize themselves as members of a group, a process of 
self-stereotyping is set in motion.17 That is to say, people seek to ascertain the 
norms, values and understandings which characterize the said group and then 
conform to them. Insofar as these so-called “criterial attributes” will vary from 
group to group (as an academic at my desk, it is important for me to be impartial, 
dispassionate and objective; however, place me as a sports fan at a game, then 
loyalty, passion and commitment take priority), so our behaviour will vary from 
context to context as different identities become salient. It is important to stress 
that this is a genuine process of conversion: we act on the basis of the group ide-
ology not because we succumb to the power of others or because we seek their 
approval but because it defi nes who we are and what counts for us. That is, the 
terms which guide and control our actions as group members are defi ned by a 
social construct that cannot be reduced to any single individual. The concept of 
social identity thereby opens the way to a psychological understanding of how the 
individual can act as a social subject in ideologically intelligible ways.
Insofar as the definition of a social identity (or else the precise implica-
tion it has for action in the immediate context) is not self-evident, then group 
12 Tom R. Tyler & Stephen L. Blader, Cooperation in Groups: Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and Behavioral 
Engagement, Psychology Press, Philadelphia, PA, 2000.
13  Mark Levine, Clare Cassidy, Gemma Brazier & Stephen Reicher, “Self-categorisation and bystander non-
intervention: Two experimental studies,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 7, 2002, pp. 1452-1463; 
Mark Levine, Amy Prosser, David Evans & Stephen Reicher, “Identity and emergency intervention: How 
social group membership and inclusiveness of group boundaries shapes helping behaviour,” Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 31, 2005, pp. 443-453; Stephen Reicher, Clare Cassidy, Nick Hopkins 
& Mark Levine, “Saving Bulgaria’s Jews: An analysis of social identity and the mobilisation of social 
solidarity,” European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 36, 2006, pp. 49-72.
14  Haslam, op. cit. (note 11); Reicher & Haslam, op. cit. (note 10).
15  Stephen Reicher, Alex Haslam & Nick Hopkins, “Social identity and the dynamics of leadership: Leaders 
and followers as collaborative agents in the transformation of social reality,” Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 16, 
2005, pp. 547-568.
16  John Turner, “Examining the nature of power: A three-process theory,” European Journal of Social 
Psychology, Vol. 35, 2005, pp. 1-22.
17  Turner, op. cit. (note 10); John Turner, Social Infl uence, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1991.
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members need to seek out or else evaluate information relating to these issues 
in order to know what to do. For this reason, the process of self-stereotyping 
is also, in effect, a process of influence with implications for who will be influ-
enced, what will be influential and who will exert influence. Thus, only those 
who identify with a social category will be influenced by information about the 
group identity. Those who do so identify will only be influenced by information 
that is evidently consonant with the category defi nition. And only those who are 
in a position to give an authoritative defi nition of group identity — in particular, 
those who are perceived as exemplary (or prototypical) group members — will be 
in a position to exert group influence. 
Societal implications of social identity processes
Third, social identity theory is explicitly formulated to be of relevance to large-
scale social categories as well as small groups. Indeed, when Tajfel18 introduced 
the concept of social identity, he drew on Emerson’s19 discussion of the nation as 
a body of people who feel they are a nation. More generally, the concept of the 
group as a set of people sharing a social identity is close to Anderson’s famous 
definition of nations as “imagined communities.”20 From this perspective, the 
broader societal implications of the foregoing processes can be readily appreci-
ated. To define a set of people as belonging to a common social category (or, 
more accurately, to lead a set of people to define themselves as belonging to a 
common social category) is to create social power through mobilizing people to 
act together, and to define the parameters which constitute the social category 
is to guide how that power is applied. 
More specifi cally, the defi nition of who is included in the category (cat-
egory boundaries) will determine the extent of the mobilization, the defi nition of 
what it means to be a category member (category content) will determine the direc-
tion of the mobilization, and the defi nition of who best exemplifi es the category 
(category prototypes) will determine the leadership of the mobilization.21 This can 
be summarized by saying that social categories constitute the mobilizations that 
(re)make the social world. To control the defi nition of social categories hence con-
fers a world-making power. How, then, do these defi nitions come about?
Defi ning social categories: Infl uence agents as entrepreneurs of social 
identity
One broad consequence of the Le Bonian tradition of collective irrationality 
is a tendency to see group level perceptions as a form of error and distortion. 
By contrast, those in the social identity tradition, and self-categorization 
18  Henri Tajfel, Differentiation between Social Groups, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978.
19  Ralph Waldo Emerson, From Empire to Nation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 1960. 
20  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Verso, London, 1983.
21 For more details see Stephen Reicher & Nick Hopkins, Self and Nation, Sage, London, 2001.
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theorists in particular, stress that these perceptions must be related to social 
reality. The original emphasis was on the way in which the perceptions of social 
categories reflected the social structuring of social contexts.22 More recently, 
emphasis has been laid on the way in which social categories are used to 
mobilize people in order to create structures in the social world.23 That is to say, 
there is a bi-directional relationship between social categorization and social 
reality. Categories both reflect present social realities and are also constructed 
in relation to projects for the future of society. All those who actively seek to 
shape social reality — politicians, NGOs, movement activists — are necessarily 
concerned with the definition of social categories. To be effective, they must be 
skilled entrepreneurs of identity.
In overall terms, this skill involves constituting as a single category the 
audience which the entrepreneur wishes to mobilize, constituting the project 
which the entrepreneur wants to achieve as an instantiation of the norms, val-
ues and priorities associated with this category and constituting the entrepre-
neur him/herself as prototypical of the category. Let us briefly illustrate these 
broad claims with specific instances.
On 2 April 1982, Argentinian forces landed on the Falkland Islands — a 
place unknown by most of the British population and, even to the extent that 
it was known, one that had hitherto been of little concern. Certainly, there was 
no outcry when, the previous year, the citizenship status of the islanders had 
been severely downgraded in the 1981 Nationality Act. The next day, 3 April, 
the British parliament met on a Saturday for the first time since Suez and voted 
to send a military task force to reclaim the Islands. However, for the military 
mobilization to be possible it was necessary to create a popular mobilization in 
favour of war. It was necessary to get people to feel engaged in the events and to 
feel outrage as if they themselves were under attack. 
The frontpage headline of the Daily Express newspaper on 3April was: 
‘Our loyal subjects. We MUST defend them’ (emphases in the original). The 
second paragraph of the article read: “The right of the Falkland islanders, peo-
ple who are wholly British in origin, sentiment and loyalty, to remain British 
and to continue to live under British rule must be defended as if it were the 
Isle of Wight which had been invaded.” These words were echoed by Margaret 
Thatcher in her speech to the House of Commons. She concluded: “The people 
of the Falkland Islands, like the people of the United Kingdom, are an island 
race. Their way of life is British; their allegiance is to the Crown. They are few 
22  Penny Oakes, Alex Haslam & John Turner, Stereotyping and Social Reality, Sage, London, 1994; Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, op. cit. (note 7).
23 Reicher, Haslam & Hopkins, op. cit. (note 15), pp. 547-568; Stephen Reicher & Nick Hopkins, 
“Constructing categories and mobilising masses: An analysis of Thatcher’s and Kinnock’s speeches on the 
British miner’s strike 1984-5,” European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol.26, 1996, pp. 353-371; Stephen 
Reicher & Nick Hopkins, “Seeking infl uence through characterising self-categories: An analysis of anti-
abortionist rhetoric,” British Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 35, 1996, pp. 297-312; Stephen Reicher, & 
Nick Hopkins, Self and Nation, Sage, London, 2001; Stephen.Reicher & Nick Hopkins, “On the science of 
the art of leadership,” in D. van Knippenberg & M. Hogg (eds.), Identity, Leadership and Power, Blackwell, 
Oxford 2003.
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in number, but they have the right to live in peace, to choose their own way of 
life and to determine their own allegiance. Their way of life is British; their alle-
giance is to the Crown. It is the wish of the British people and the duty of Her 
Majesty’s Government to do everything that we can to uphold that right.”
By constituting the Falkland Islanders as emblematically British, an 
attack upon them became an attack upon Britain. Moreover, by constituting the 
population in identical national terms (both the Express and the Prime Minister 
take it as given that their audience is positioned as a British people), then all 
became the subjects of Argentinian aggression. Thus, the fate of the Falklanders 
(which previously concerned, let alone outraged, virtually no one in the UK) 
now became the fate of all. Or, to put it more technically, the use of inclusive 
categories that linked victims to the population as a whole provided the basis 
for mobilizing the population for war (and in favour of those prosecuting the 
war). Support for the war surged and stayed at between 70 and 80% throughout 
the conflict, Margaret Thatcher, previously the most unpopular post-war Prime 
Minister, became the most popular. The ruling Conservative Party doubled its 
opinion poll rating from 23% in December 1981 to 46% just after the war. 
So, broad categories enable broad mobilizations and hence the broader 
the mobilization one wants to achieve the more inclusive one’s categories need 
to be. Nationality, for instance, does not necessarily encompass the whole popu-
lation. It can be defined in a series of ways involving lesser or greater inclusion: 
as a matter of descent (in which case migrants and hence most ethnic minori-
ties are included); of birth (more inclusive, but still excluding first generation 
migrants); or of involvement in and commitment to national life (thus includ-
ing everyone in the national territory who so chooses). To use an example that 
is local to us, there are groups in Scotland who seek to mobilize only sections of 
the population in direct action and are content to use ethnically exclusive defi-
nitions of Scottishness. By contrast, those political parties who want to be voted 
into office cannot afford to exclude any section of the electorate and therefore 
use highly inclusive formulations of the national category. For instance Alex 
Salmond, leader of the separatist Scottish National Party (SNP), spoke to his 
1995 party conference in the following terms: “our ambition is to see the cause 
of Scotland argued with English, French, Irish, Indian, Pakistani, Chinese and 
every other accent in the rich tapestry of what we should be proud to call, in the 
words of Willie McIllvanney, ‘the mongrel nation’ of Scotland.”
It wasn’t just the separatists who used such an inclusive definition of 
nationhood and employed it to appeal to the population. All the main parties 
did likewise, even the Conservative party who vehemently opposed any exten-
sion of Scottish statehood.24 The value of using “Scottishness” lay in its ability 
to reach the entire electoral audience, not in any inherent link to a particular 
policy or ideology, and since all the parties sought to reach this same audience, 
they did not differ in their appeal to people as Scots. Where identity did link 
to policy and ideology, and hence where the parties differed profoundly, was in 
24  See Reicher & Hopkins, Self and Nation, op. cit. (note 23). 
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the content ascribed to being Scottish. In other words, parties all appealed to 
the same national category because they wanted to appeal to the same people, 
but they all characterized the category differently because they all wanted to get 
people to do different things. For the left-wingers of the Labour Party, Scots 
are inherently egalitarian, communal, welfarist and opposed to privilege — in 
the words of one Labour parliamentarian, they endorse “the corporate commu-
nity that is Scotland.” For the right-wingers of the Conservative party, Scots are 
inherently “canny and thrifty,” hard-working and entrepreneurial. In each case, 
the party purports not to impose its view on the audience but, it claims, sim-
ply expresses what they already believe (while the opposition abnegates these 
beliefs). The link is often implicit but is sometimes made quite explicit. For 
instance, according to the Conservatives (or at least the party’s Ian Lang, when 
he was Secretary of State for Scotland), “distinctive Scottish qualities” are “so 
compatible with Conservatism,” while “socialism” is “alien.”
However, of all the rhetorical efforts expended by politicians, perhaps 
the most intense are devoted to constructing themselves. Indeed, it may be said 
that the key to being chosen as a representative by an audience is to render one-
self representative of that audience. All political autobiography is either selected 
or invented to that end. There are therefore countless examples to choose from: 
Margaret Thatcher altering her dress, her appearance, even lowering her voice, 
to personify herself as “Britannia” in order to rule the British people; Tony 
Blair, the erstwhile rock guitarist who represented a new “cool Britannia” to the 
electorate; George W Bush as the leather-jacketed Texan whose verbal mishaps 
only made him more plausible as a typical middle-American. Wilner,25 provides 
a particularly detailed case study of the way in which the Indonesian leader 
Sukharno was represented as Bima, the legendary hero and demigod of Javanese 
and Balinese mythology. Like Bima, Sukharno’s life story was told so as to high-
light the key attributes of bravery and stubbornness. To echo Bima, Sukharno’s 
physical muscularity, his booming voice, his brutal gestures and his coarse lan-
guage were emphasized, although these violated the norms of Indonesia’s domi-
nant cultural groups. Sukharno even evoked Bima’s association with the colour 
black (which symbolizes strength) by invariably carrying a black baton. When 
it comes to trading influence, the determined entrepreneur of identity can leave 
no detail to chance.
Mobilizing hate 
One way of reframing and encapsulating what we have argued thus far is to say 
that effective mass communication involves construing speaker and audience as 
mutually involved in a common social category so that the speaker can inter-
pret the relationship of actual and possible events in terms of shared collective 
concerns. Communicators put themselves in a position to answer certain key 
25  Ann Ruth Wilner, The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership, Yale University Press, New Haven, 
1984.
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questions for their intended constituency: “What does this mean for us? Does 
it represent or undermine who we are, what we believe in and what we care 
about?” Thus far we have addressed these processes and techniques in general 
terms. Let us now apply them to the more specific issues of intergroup rela-
tions. In particular, how is it possible to mobilize people to condone — or even 
actively participate in — violence towards others? 
We suggest that, as with any other phenomenon, collective evaluations 
of human beings and actions towards them depend upon how their significance 
for “us” as a social group is viewed. That is, the orientation of an audience to a 
given target depends upon how “we” are construed, how “they” are construed, 
and on the relationship that is put together between these two constructions. 
Contrary to much popular belief and academic misinterpretation, there is no 
inherent antipathy or antagonism between people who are different or even 
who are seen as belonging to different groups.26 Even where such antagonism is 
presented as a reflection of “ancient hatreds,” much rhetorical work goes into 
creating the conditions of exclusion, discrimination and violence. 
The importance of analysing the nature of this work becomes all the more 
apparent if one accepts that, in the main, even the most appalling acts are rarely 
accepted as such by those who perpetrate them. Violence is generally legitimated 
as “self-defence” against the perceived aggression of the target27 and atrocity is 
generally represented as a noble and even virtuous act. Or, to put it the other way 
round, atrocity becomes more possible when the perpetrators can regard them-
selves as doing good. Indeed, perhaps one of the most chilling speeches of the 
twentieth century was delivered by Himmler to SS personnel in Poznan, Poland, 
on 4 October 1943: “Most of you must know what it means when one hundred 
corpses are lying side by side, or fi ve hundred or a thousand. To have stuck it out 
and at the same time… to have remained decent fellows. This is a page of glory in 
our history.”28 How, then, can genocide be sanctioned as virtue?
The process can be analytically divided into three elements, although 
in practice they may be intertwined. First, and most importantly, the ingroup 
identity needs to be construed so as to exclude the outgroup. Perhaps the most 
dangerous form this takes is to defi ne the national community (“the people”) in 
ethnic terms — or, as Mann29 puts it, to render the demos as ethnos. At this point, 
the minority are already excluded from the benefi ts of national inclusion, the 
rights and resources that stem from being a “national.” Moreover, to identify peo-
ple as a distinct category raises a “minority question” for the majority. It does not 
in itself determine any particular course of action, but it does provide a space in 
26  Stephen Reicher, “The context of social psychology: Domination, resistance and change,” Political 
Psychology, Vol. 25, 2004, pp. 40-62.
27 Clifford Stott, Paul Hutchison & John Drury, “ ‘Hooligans’ abroad? Inter-group dynamics, social identity 
and participation in collective ‘disorder’ at the 1998 World Cup Finals,” British Journal of Social Psychology, 
Vol. 40, 2001, pp. 359-384; Clifford Stott, & Stephen Reicher, “How confl ict escalates: The inter-group 
dynamics of collective football crowd ‘violence’,” Sociology, Vol. 32, 1998, pp. 353-377.
28  Claudia Koonz, The Nazi Conscience, Belknapp Press, Cambridge MA., 2003, p. 221.
29  Michael Mann, “The dark side of democracy,” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004. 
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which extreme answers can be proposed. It furthermore allows the institutions of 
the nation and (where relevant) the State to be mobilized in order to implement 
any “solution.”
Second, the minority needs to be construed as a problem, or, more 
acutely, a threat for the ingroup. Much is often made of the dehumanization 
of outgroups, but when one looks more closely at the images used by genocidal 
regimes it becomes clear that outgroups are often portrayed both as subhu-
man and superhuman.30 In Hutu extremist propaganda, Tutsis were sometimes 
Inyenzi (cockroaches) and sometimes Inkotanyi (tough fighters). In Nazi propa-
ganda, Jews were sometimes maggots and rats and sometimes all-knowing and 
all-powerful figures. It wasn’t just that they were animals, but that they were 
vermin: out of place, polluting, defiling. Nor was it just that they were powerful, 
but that they were conspiring against Germany. What these different images had 
in common was the danger and threat to the ingroup that the outgroup suppos-
edly represented. Often the implied threat was one of physical annihilation, but 
often it was a symbolic annihilation: the destruction of ingroup identity and of 
a way of life based on ingroup norms and values. At this point a violent solu-
tion to “the minority question” is legitimated, since violence can be construed 
as self-defence.
Third, the ingroup needs to be construed as virtuous. This is, perhaps, 
the most under-appreciated aspect of the process. It is, however, addressed com-
prehensively in Koonz’s book ‘The Nazi Conscience’. She writes: “(a)lthough it 
may strain credulity to conceive of Adolf Hitler as a prophet of virtue, therein 
lay the secret of his immense popularity.”31 Hitler characterized the German 
Volk as an ethical community, as selflessly devoted to others, modest and abste-
mious in their tastes. He celebrated their humility, their purity, their cleanli-
ness. He pledged himself to defend German “morality, customs, sense of justice, 
religion, etc.”32 Koonz emphasizes that in the years after 1933 Hitler repeatedly 
celebrated “the pillars of (German) national character,” but hardly ever men-
tioned the Jews. Some commentators thought this reflected a softening of his 
views, but here they missed the point entirely. 
The key, but implicit, premise of all Hitler’s rhetoric was a celebra-
tion of Germany as an ethnic community. In this context, the virtuous con-
tent of group identity — solidarity, altruism, respect, love, devotion — leads to 
prosocial behaviour only towards those within this community. With regard to 
Jews, these norms did not translate directly into behaviour but rather worked 
through their impact on the significance of this outgroup for the ingroup. The 
more Germany was celebrated and the more the people became devoted to it, 
the more rage could be directed against those who threatened it. The more the 
Volk were seen to be good, the more evil enemy actions were perceived to be and 
30  See as examples Hege Lovdal Gulseth, “The use of propaganda in the Rwandan genocide,” unpublished 
thesis, University of Oslo, 2004; D. Welch, The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda, Routledge, London, 
1993. 
31  Koonz, op. cit., (note 28), p. 17.
32  Ibid., p. 21.
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the more virtuous it became to destroy the enemy. Hence Hitler’s rhetoric did 
not need to mention Jewish people explicitly. Instead it created the conditions 
under which it became unexceptional to propose the destruction of Jewry. 
In effect Hitler and his propagandists “crafted a national morality play”33 
in which the poor honest Volk were faced by a satanic alien and the hero was he 
who struck that alien down. That is how Himmler was able to describe members 
of the Gestapo as “men with human kindness, with human hearts, and absolute 
rightness.”34 They, alongside members of the SS, undertook those unpleasant 
but necessary tasks which everyone knew to be necessary but not everyone had 
the courage or discipline to carry through. This example synthesizes the vari-
ous elements we have been describing. Once the exclusive ingroup is seen to be 
threatened by the excluded outgroup, then the more one emphasizes ingroup 
virtue, the more one removes limits to action against the outgroup. There is 
an important theoretical and practical point here. On the whole, work on dis-
crimination in psychology and other disciplines has focused on representations 
of the outgroup. However, the explicit focus of “hate rhetoric” is frequently on 
who “we” are and this leaves implicit (but obvious) who is excluded. Equally, 
once it is evident who “they” are and that “they” endanger us, then a focus on 
ingroup vulnerability and ingroup virtue is sufficient to legitimate intergroup 
violence. Unlike the early observers of the Third Reich, we should not be fooled 
into thinking that those who do not denigrate outgroup members are necessar-
ily any the less hateful towards them.
To underscore this point, we shall conclude this section with another 
example taken from a very different cultural context. On 27 February 2002 
a train carrying Hindu activists caught fire as it passed through the town of 
Godhra in India and 59 passengers died. Hindu nationalist groups such as the 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) claimed that the train had been attacked by 
Muslims and this led to a wave of anti-Muslim rioting in the province of Gujarat 
during which up to 1,000 people were killed. Pravin Togadia, one of the leaders 
of VHP, was one of those who, according to the Muslim Milli Gazette, justified 
this violence. Yet after having interviewed Togadia, the paper perceives “a silver 
lining in the darkness of hate” owing to the fact that he sees Indian Muslims 
and Hindus as sharing a common ancestry. Indeed, the report on the interview 
is entitled “We (Hindus and Muslims) are ethnically and culturally the same.”35 
Yet this is to mistake similarity and a common past for common identity in the 
present. Even though these are frequently connected — and construals of ances-
try are often a basis for constructing present identity — the connection is not 
a necessary one. In fact, Togadia uses historical similarity as a basis for casting 
Muslims as an inherently dangerous “other.”
Togadia bases his views on the claim that India is an inherently Hindu 
country and that originally the entire population was Hindu. He also claims 
33  Ibid., p. 23.
34  Ibid., p. 228.
35  Milli Gazette (2006): “We (Hindus and Muslims) are ethnically and culturally the same,” available at: 
<http://www.milligazette.com/Archives/15102002/1510200233.htm>, (last visited on 19 January 2006).
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that Hinduism is an inherently tolerant and humane belief system. To his mind, 
Muslims are those who deliberately turned against this credo. They are the one 
thing worse than enemies — they are renegades.36 By their very nature they 
threaten the group by corroding it from the inside. Moreover, by turning against 
an inherently virtuous group they are inherently depraved. 
In this way the ingroup value of tolerance serves to justify a policy of 
extreme intolerance. Destruction of Muslims is a necessary defence against 
evil. So Togadia crafts his own morality play by drawing upon local cultural 
resources, notably the stories of the god Rama. Thus he states that: “(w)hen the 
secularists selectively condemn the Gujarat violence, it seems that without Sita 
haran (Sita’s abduction) the Lanka dahan (Lanka’s burning) is imagined.” The 
reference is to the story of the good goddess Sita, who was abducted by the bad 
demon Ravana. Rama, Sita’s husband, destroyed Ravana, an event brought about 
by Ravana’s own actions and an act of purification. In the same way (Togadia 
implies) the massacre of Muslims was necessitated and justified by their own 
destructive nature as displayed at Godhra.
In sum, we must beware of taking descriptions of similarity and differ-
ence in the abstract, and the same goes for characterizations of the ingroup and 
outgroup. To repeat, what counts is how “we” and “they” are construed and the 
meaning of “them” for “us.” Hence a common past can invoke antagonism when 
it is used as an antecedent of opposition, and ingroup “tolerance” can invoke 
intolerance when it is supposedly threatened by the outgroup. As Koonz con-
cludes: “(t)he potential for racial hatred lurks whenever political leaders appeal 
to the exalted virtue of their own ethnic community.”37
Mobilizing solidarity
It is valid to study hate in its own right. But also, if we understand the conditions 
which create antagonism, we thereby understand what to do in order to avoid 
it or even invoke positive acts towards other people. If the starting point for 
entrepreneurs of hatred is to create an exclusive definition of the “moral” 
community, then it follows that entrepreneurs of solidarity need to define their 
communities more inclusively.
Consider the following study.38 Supporters of Manchester United foot-
ball club are recruited for an experiment. In a first scenario, they are greeted in 
one building, their support for the team is stressed, and then they are told to 
go to another building in order to be tested. As they are on their way they see 
someone (actually an actor) fall over and hurt himself. This person is wearing 
either a Manchester United shirt, a rival team’s (Liverpool) shirt or an ordinary 
36  José M. Marques & Dario Paez, “The ‘black sheep effect’: Social categorisation, rejection of ingroup deviates 
and perception of group variability,” European Review of Social Psychology, Vol. 6, 1994, pp. 37-68.
37  Koonz, op. cit. (note 28), p. 274.
38  Levine, Prosser, Evans & Reicher, “Identity and emergency intervention: How social group membership 
and inclusiveness of group boundaries shapes helping behaviour,” op. cit. (note 13), pp. 443-453.
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T-shirt. In the first case, help is almost universal. In the other two cases people 
almost always just walk on by. A second scenario is identical to the first, apart 
from the fact that here the Manchester United fans are told they are taking part 
in a study on how football supporters in general are treated. This time, they go 
to the aid of the actor both when he is wearing a Manchester United shirt and a 
Liverpool shirt. They still pass by him when he is wearing an ordinary T-shirt.
Two conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, we are more likely 
to help people when they are ingroup members. Second, and more important 
perhaps, the nature of our ingroup categories can be defi ned differently, and the 
more inclusive the categories the wider the nature of our helping. Of course, for 
all its clarity this study concerns a rather trivial incident. So consider a second 
study.39 This involves British participants whose identity either as British or as 
European is stressed by the experimenters. They are then given information about 
natural disasters such as hurricanes and fl oods and told that they have occurred 
either elsewhere in Europe or in South America. How much help do participants 
give to victims in these different conditions? The results indicate that, when 
British identity is made salient, there is no difference in the level of support given 
to victims as a function of whether disasters are ascribed to Europe or South 
America. However, when European identity is made salient, more support is given 
in the European than in the South American case. What is more, the level of sup-
port given to European victims is greater when European identity as opposed 
to British identity is salient. So once again, using a more socially consequential 
example, people are helped more when they are ingroup members and therefore 
patterns of helping depend upon the boundaries of the currently salient identity.
Finally, let us turn from the experimental manipulation of social 
identities to the ways in which identities are actually used by those who seek 
to promote social solidarity. We have spent much time addressing the dark 
side of virtue, so it is appropriate to conclude by considering the brighter 
side of even the most terrible times. In amidst the horrors of the Holocaust 
there are some remarkable examples of rescue both on an individual level and, 
more consequentially and more relevant for us, on a collective level.40 Perhaps 
the most remarkable example of collective rescue is to be found in Bulgaria. 
Although Jewish people were sent to their deaths from annexed territories, not 
a single Jew was deported from ‘Old’ Bulgaria, and more Jews were living in the 
country at the end of the war than at the beginning.41 When, in 1940 and 1943, 
39  Mark Levine & Karen Thompson, “Identity, place, and bystander intervention: Social categories and 
helping after natural disasters,” Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 144, 2004, pp. 229-245.
40  Kristen R. Monroe, “Altruism and the theory of rational action: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe,” Ethics, 
Vol. 101, 1990, pp. 117-118; Kristen R. Monroe, “The psychology of genocide: A review of the literature,” 
Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 9, 1995, pp. 215-239; Samuel P. Oliner & Pearl M. Oliner, The Altruistic 
Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe, Free Press, New York, 1992.
41  Abram Ben-Yakov, “Bulgaria,” in I. Gutman (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, (2 Vols.), MacMillan, 
New York, 1990; A. Cohen & A. Assa, Saving the Jews in Bulgaria: 1941-1944, State Publishing House 
“Septemvri,” Sofi a, 1997; R. Genov & I. Baeva, “‘Incomprehension of the nature of the race question’: 
Saving the Bulgarian Jews from the Holocaust,” in G. Halfdanarson (ed.), Racial Discrimination and 
Ethnicity in European History, Edizioni Plus, Pisa University Press, Pisa, 2003.
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measures were taken against the Jewish population, there were widespread 
counter-mobilizations which ultimately prevented genocide taking place. 
Todorov 42 describes these mobilizations and reproduces the documents 
which were used to instigate them. We have analysed the nature of the argu-
ments that they contain.43 These take three forms. The first is “ingroup inclu-
sion.” Jews are rarely described as such but rather referred to as part of the 
nation, a national minority. It is stressed that they are Bulgarian in their cul-
ture, their habits, even in the songs that children sing and the games they play. 
To quote from an open letter from the Bulgarian Writers Union to the Prime 
Minister and Chair of the National Assembly, the aim of repressive legislation 
“is to deprive a Bulgarian national minority of its civil rights... Our legislature 
must not approve a law that will enslave one part of Bulgaria’s citizens, and leave 
a black page in our modern history.”
A second set of arguments concerned “category norms,” and more spe-
cifi cally the notion that Bulgarians have “traditions of religious tolerance and 
humanity” (to quote again from the Writers Union) and are therefore inherently 
inclined to oppose oppression and protect the weak. It is striking how similar 
these claims are to Togadia’s claims about Hindus. Yet here Jews are included as 
ingroup members, rather than excluded and categorized as threats to the group. 
Hence the construction of the group as virtuous serves as protection rather than 
as a warrant for violence. Indeed Dimo Kazasov, in another open letter to the 
Prime Minister, argues that should they fail to help the Jews, the people: “will lose 
their moral and spiritual uniqueness, their Slavic essence, their Bulgarian face.”
The third set of arguments focuses directly on “category interests,” stat-
ing in particular that, were the country to sanction the deportation of the Jewish 
population, it would gain a negative reputation in the eyes of other countries and 
may forfeit benefits as a result. To quote from the Writers Union one last time, 
Bulgaria might “lose [its] place among the world’s free and civilized peoples.” 
Thus the threat to the group comes not from the Jews but from attacks against 
the Jews. Correspondingly the defence of the ingroup comes from defending 
and not attacking Jewish people.
Overall, what we see in the Bulgarian opposition to genocide are exactly 
the same elements as in the German sanction for genocide: definitions of cat-
egory inclusion/exclusion, definitions of how the ingroup is threatened and 
how to defend it, and definitions of ingroup values and virtues. What matters, 
then is exactly how these elements are defined and configured. In the context 
of subgroup exclusion, imagined outgroup threat and ingroup virtue, a popula-
tion can be mobilized to hate and to condone or even support hateful policies. 
However, in the context of subgroup inclusion, constructions of threat and vir-
tue can operate in precisely the opposite direction and serve as powerful tools 
for those who wish to promote solidarity and rescue.
42  Tzvetan Todorov, The Fragility of Goodness, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2001.
43  Reicher, Cassidy, Hopkins, & Levine, “Saving Bulgaria’s Jews: An analysis of social identity and the 
mobilisation of social solidarity,” op. cit. (note 13), pp. 49-72.
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Conclusion: Grasping the tools of power
In this paper we have sought to demonstrate the importance of category con-
structions as the basis for effective mass communication and mass mobiliza-
tion. This is not to suggest this is all there is to communication and mobi-
lization. Clearly many other factors apply from the organization of the state 
to the histories and motivations of individuals. Nonetheless, we consider that 
the psychological basis of influence derives from the way in which texts invoke 
social identities. Thus, on the one hand, we argue that there are certain general 
psychological processes operating in all cases irrespective of what one is arguing 
for and whether one is promoting evil or good. What is critical, we suggest is 
how the meaning of events is aligned with the meaning of categories and how 
‘they’ are said to impact on ‘us’.
On the other hand, we argue that the actual outcome of these proces -
ses — whether they lead to tolerance or intolerance - is anything but general. 
What counts is the precise content ascribed to category boundaries, category 
content, category prototypes and category relations in any given situation. 
Clearly, the ability to create convincing definitions depends upon context, upon 
the ability to draw upon widely disseminated cultural understandings and hence 
upon both profound local knowledge and rhetorical skill. For all their claims to 
follow Le Bon, Mussolini and Hitler were particularly adept in these matters.44 
Mussolini drew on shared visions of the glorious Roman past (romanita) in 
order to construct his fascist Italy, just as Hitler drew on a popularized version of 
German romanticism — notably concepts of strong leadership (Fuhrerprinzip) 
over an ethnic community (Volksgemeinschaft) — in popularizing Nazi ideol-
ogy. Neither leader built his ideas from scratch, nor were those ideas an epiphe-
nomenal reflection of something that already existed. Both skilfully crafted a 
Manichean vision of the world out of the resources they had to hand. Both were 
brilliant entrepreneurs of identity.
The difference between entrepreneurs of hate and entrepreneurs of soli-
darity is not only a matter of the constructions they use, but also of the way they 
authorize these constructions 45. A distinction can be made between democratic 
discourse, which makes explicit the grounds on which proposals are linked 
to identities and hence opens up space for debate and alternatives, and auto-
cratic discourse which takes the link for granted and hence rules out debate. 
At the extreme, the speaker portrays him or (much more rarely) herself as not 
just a representative of the category (amongst others) but rather as the living 
embodiment of the category — an avatar of the collective essence. The closing 
peroration by Rudolf Hess to the 1934 Nuremburg rally, where he asserted that 
‘Hitler is Germany just as Germany is Hitler’ is but one example of this. In such 
cases anything the speaker says is, by definition, an expression of group identity 
44  Stephen Reicher, “The crowd century: Reconciling theoretical failure with practical success,” British 
Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 35, 1996, pp. 535-553.
45  See Reicher & Hopkins, “On the science of the art of leadership,” op cit. (note 23).
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and anyone who opposes the speaker is, by definition, attacking the category. 
Discussion becomes treachery, autocracy is thereby guaranteed. 
There is, perhaps, a third difference between the advocates of intoler-
ance and the champions of tolerance — albeit of a rather different sort. On 
examination, many of the various dictatorial and genocidal regimes of our era 
seem to have a powerful understanding of how to use identity in order to sup-
port their pernicious projects. They know how to build up their constituency, 
how to enrage them and direct their rage against specified targets. Likewise, 
they know how to destroy the collective resistance of their targets by so shaming 
them that they cannot join together to fight back. In short, the entrepreneurs of 
hatred have fully grasped the psychological tools of power and know how to use 
them. But is the same true of those who wish to defend and support the weak 
and vulnerable? Do we make full use of the tools which promote social solidar-
ity? Are we effective entrepreneurs of solidarity? Because if we do not address 
the question of category construction and how to use it for good, we thereby 
allow evil to triumph.
